Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://dipositint.ub.edu/dspace/handle/2445/187819
Title: On convexity in cooperative games with externalities
Author: Alonso-Meijide, José Mª
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel
Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria, 1962-
Jiménez-Losada, Andrés
Keywords: Externalitats (Economia)
Teoria de jocs
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Optimització matemàtica
Externalities (Economics)
Game theory
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Mathematical optimization
Issue Date: 1-Jul-2022
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Abstract: We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the most efficient organization of agents. The convexity of a game is equivalent to having non decreasing contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01371-8
It is part of: Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 74, p. 265-292
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/187819
Related resource: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01371-8
ISSN: 0938-2259
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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