Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://dipositint.ub.edu/dspace/handle/2445/207069| Title: | Externalities and the (Pre)nucleolus in Cooperative Games |
| Author: | Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel Ehlers, Lars |
| Keywords: | Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Estadística matemàtica Geometria algebraica Teoria d'operadors Cooperative games (Mathematics) Mathematical statistics Algebraic geometry Operator theory |
| Issue Date: | 1-Mar-2024 |
| Publisher: | Elsevier B.V. |
| Abstract: | In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed. |
| Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003 |
| It is part of: | Mathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 128, num.March, p. 10-15 |
| URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/207069 |
| Related resource: | https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003 |
| ISSN: | 0165-4896 |
| Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
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