Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://dipositint.ub.edu/dspace/handle/2445/67759
Title: Territory, identity, and federalist preferences: Survey and experimental evidence
Author: Balcells, Laia
Fernández Albertos, José
Kuo, Alexander
Keywords: Distribució de la renda
Descentralització administrativa
Federalisme
Política fiscal
Income distribution
Decentralization in government
Federalism
Issue Date: 2012
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Economia i territori. Càtedra Pasqual Maragall
Series/Report no: [WP E-CPM12/05]
Abstract: What explains citizen preferences for redistribution across regions within a country? Around the world, countries vary greatly in how much central governments tax wealthier regions to redistribute to poorer ones in order to reduce inequality across regions. In many federations or multi-tiered polities, these issues are salient, electorally contested, and at times polarizing; they have sometimes led to demands for or attempts at secession from disaffected regions. Such issues have been politicized in wealthy countries including Belgium, Canada, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, as well as in poorer or middle-income states including Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and Russia. Yet the recent growth in research on the causes and consequences of different federal arrangements and fiscal federalism have not studied in depth the roots of individual preferences over basic issues related to federal institutions and fiscal federalism. This omission is surprising given the high salience of this package of issues in such countries.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/catedramaragall/old/eng/WP-5-2012final.pdf
It is part of: Càtedra Pasqual Maragall d'Economia i Territori – Documents de treball, WP 05/2012
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/67759
Appears in Collections:Documents de Treball (Càtedra Pasqual Maragall d'Economia i Territori)

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